Analysis by Oleksandr Mikhelson
Glavred website, Kiev, Ukraine, in Russian 21 Apr 04
BBC Monitoring Service, UK, in English, Apr 24, 2004

The following is the text of the article, posted on the Ukrainian web site Glavred on 21 April under the title "Quo vadis, SES?"; the original subheadings have been retained:

The immortal phrase of the no less immortal bankrupt [film character] Golokhvastov - "It is, of course, very, very... But why?" - could come to be the key question inside the Supreme Council [parliament], which has approved Ukraine's latest strategic choice - this time in favour of the SES [Single Economic Space].

TANGO FOR FOUR

So where do we go now? In fact, there is very little specific information. Yes, the main features of the Single Economic Space of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan are well known. But they are interpreted in very different ways.

The first step is a free trade zone [FTZ]. Ukraine insisted that there should be no exclusions and no restrictions. Russia officially declared, through the previous prime minister [Mikhail Kasyanov] and the present Russian ambassador to Ukraine [Viktor Chernomyrdin]: don't even think about domestic prices for sources of energy [between the SES countries]. President Kuchma heeded the wailing of the poor Russians and started to talk about "temporary restrictions" on "certain groups of goods", although, as the experience of Russian-Ukrainian "trade wars" shows, there is nothing more permanent than the temporary and nothing more all-embracing than certain groups of goods. But none of that is of any interest. The State Duma [the Russian parliament] has not - for how many years now? - thought of ratifying the long-drafted FTZ treaty. In other words, the Russians do not need the FTZ now either.

The reason is that Russia's demonstrable objective is to take further steps within the SES. What are wanted specifically are a customs union and, ultimately, a currency union, as well as joint efforts regarding external trading partners and with a view to integration with Europe and entry to the WTO [World Trade Organization]. We shall come back to the particular importance of the latter points.

All this is to be coordinated by some single supranational body, in which the votes will be distributed in accordance with the members' economic potential. Just like the EU, say SES supporters. Ultimately, though, Russia will, according to various estimates command some 80 per cent of the votes. There is nothing like that in the EU, but that's a trifle. Then the EU can be joined through a referendum, accompanied, if necessary, by the relevant amendments to the constitution. But that is even more of a nonsense. The people should be kept out of serious matters, although it is legitimate to say that it was SES supporters in the person of the Communists who once proposed (admittedly, more for PR purposes) that such a referendum should be held, and it was the opponents of the SES who objected to it.

In the short run, decisions should be taken by the presidents of the four countries, by a sort of consensus. But the creation of the supranational body in the future remains the principal argument of those opposed to the SES. Its supporters respond with... silence [ellipsis as published]. Even during yesterday's discussion of the SES, one of the majority MPs contrived to make just one statement, apparently, on the subject. The gist of it was that the supranational body will be created in the future; it does not yet exist... [ellipsis as published]. That is the serious opinion of a serious person.

While the SES documents were being drafted, Ukraine tabled quite a few assorted criticisms that the Russians (quite rightly) regarded as attempts to "emasculate" the real substance of the agreement. These crafty plans proved futile: the Supreme Council [parliament] approved the SES by 266 votes with just one proviso, originated by the president: Ukraine will participate in the creation and the functioning of the SES "within a framework that does not run counter to the Ukrainian constitution". We shall return to this remarkable thought too later on.

In the meantime, let us answer the first "why?" - in the context of Russia. Statements to the effect that Moscow wants to "restore the USSR" and "enslave Ukraine" are as empty as words about "restoring the ties, the sundering of which led to ruin". But there are some perfectly concrete things. In particular, there are the European Union and the WTO, already mentioned. We can now forget once and for all about joining the first. Please do not disturb the gentlemen in the parliamentary majority and the Cabinet of Ministers, who failed to find a single argument in favour of the opposite view in six months.

The same applies to the WTO. Russia, with a larger and export-orientated economy, is objectively experiencing greater difficulties with joining the WTO than Ukraine. But if Ukraine entered the WTO first, that would mean, inter alia, that Ukraine might be able to dictate its terms to a Russia that was joining after it. Yesterday Russia secured the protection of its interests.

The arguments of the other side are known: as an instrument of globalization, the WTO is supposed to create a situation in which the more developed countries can dictate their terms to the less developed, particularly through the penetration of their markets by transnational corporations. That is objectively true. Unfortunately, developing this thesis so that it means "it's good to be on the side of the strong" [saying in Ukrainian] and that therefore, in alliance with Russia, we shall be able to negotiate for ourselves more acceptable terms for entering the WTO is flawed by an elementary slippage in ideas, since, for that to be the case, it is necessary, first of all, to have totally common interests. Why should Russia take account of Ukraine's interests?

If we embark on a thoroughgoing analysis, "Orthodox civilization" is, of course, to some extent, alien to the "cold pragmatism" of the Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism. Owing to completely impractical notions about "helping its Slav brothers", Tsarist Russia once became involved in a war in the Balkans, which ended, incidentally, in the heavy blow of the Crimean War. But then Vladimir Putin is a pragmatist, as those who insist on the closest ties with Russia never tire of repeating.

As a pragmatist, he must think firstly, secondly and thirdly about his own country. All in all, the Kremlin will start to worry about the interests of Ukraine only when Ukrainians are also electing the Russian leadership, i.e. when Ukraine forms an integral part of the Russian Federation, as in the time of the empire or at least in the time of the USSR. But Russia itself has no need of that in the coming decades: they do not yet know what to do with the 9m Belarusians... [ellipsis as published].

Finally, no one really yet knows how the single coordinating body and the customs and currency union will turn out. What is known, though, is that some 400 interdepartmental agreements for specific industries and even companies are being drafted within the SES framework. You may be sure that the Russians will endeavour to draw up these agreements in the most pragmatic spirit and with minimal publicity.

Incidentally, MPs from [Viktor Yushchenko's opposition bloc] Our Ukraine have mentioned one curious fact: it is intended that 2m dollars should be allocated to the preparation of these agreements, a sum that is to be provided by the SES members in equal shares. Of course, 500,000 dollars is not a lot of money, but what about the actual principle? We pay in equal shares, but take decisions in accordance with "economic potential". We can divide equally, or we can like brothers... [ellipsis as published]. That is in answer to the second "why?" concerning Ukraine's national interests.

A "GIFT" FOR SUCCESSOR

However, the SES decision was taken by perfectly specific people, behind whom stand no less specific forces and interests. What was it that prompted the president and the leaders of the executive and the legislature?

As the coordinator of the [parliamentary] majority, Stepan Havrysh, rightly observed after the vote, we have reached the end of the multi-track policy (admittedly, Mr Havrysh immediately contradicted his own words by declaring the necessity, and even the inevitability, of stepping up the dialogue with the EU). It is no secret that the multi-track policy was the brainchild of Leonid Kuchma, who was unable, for various objective and subjective reasons, to find the resources within the country for withstanding Russian pressure from the outset of his presidency in 1994. By 1999, as the authoritarian tendencies in his rule became stronger, Kuchma was less able to rely on the USA as the "counterweight" to Russia's influence.

That, analysts think, was the main reason for the proclamation of the "European choice". In other words, we have again decided to move not "towards" but "away" [from Europe], since, at the end of the 1990s, Europe had not yet rejected the EU's fundamental concept, which presupposed that any European nation was entitled to join the European Union once it had attained a certain level of economic and political development.

Over a long period, exploiting the "multi-track" idea came to be Kiev officials' only means of resisting Moscow. Russia brought about the collapse of regional initiatives like GUUAM [the loose alliance of Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova] or the Baltic-Black Sea Cooperation, in which Ukraine might have played a key role. After the "tape scandal" and not without the participation of certain intra-Ukrainian forces, the authoritarian character of Ukraine's leaders came increasingly to act like a "bogeyman" for the West, erecting a wall not only between Ukraine and the USA, but also between Ukraine and the European Union (especially since, in its competitive struggle with America, the EU was experiencing an "enlargement crisis"). The multi-track idea has been rather played out and, now that the SES has come into being, it has every chance of taking its eternal rest, remaining in history as an example of a powerful manifestation of Ukrainian disarray that fell victim to pressure from the world's order.

It is well known that Leonid Kuchma has levelled a whole series of criticisms at the SES, periodically withdrawing them. He has also encouraged members of the government to drop their objections (or did nothing to prevent them from doing so) - members who, incidentally, still keep silent about what happened to the criticisms of the draft SES agreement that were made in September by the Foreign Ministry, the Justice Ministry and the Economics Ministry. Evidently, [Foreign Minister] Kostyantyn Hryshchenko and [Justice Minister] Oleksandr Lavrynovych are still maintaining their minute's silence for [dismissed Economics Minister] Valeriy Khoroshkovskyy, who was well aware, though, of what he was taking on... [ellipsis as published].

As a result, if the incumbent president does not contest the elections - as is most likely - his successor, whoever that may be, will no longer be able to make use of the "multi-track policy". As has already been pointed out, no other instruments for protecting Ukraine's interests were created during Kuchma's time in office (we shall shelve the academic question of how realistic it was to create them anyway). That being so, Russia may well become the "guarantor" of Kuchma's post-presidential life, since the next president will, by and large, be controlled by Russia even more than the present one. The SES [Russian: YeEP] reinterpreted as "This is the Age of Putin" [Russian: "Eto Epokha Putina"] is the version for a Ukrainian leader who has no one he can trust inside the country.

In this connection, the position in which [Prime Minister] Viktor Yanukovych finds himself is of particular interest. He is now in an interesting position anyway, but, if he makes a serious bid to win the forthcoming elections, he may be in an even more interesting position. It is extremely naive to think that Russia will make use of the possibilities opening up before it if [Viktor] Yushchenko becomes president, but will make some allowances for President Yanukovych. It is a question not of personalities, but of the long-term interests of a major power. From that point of view, a unanimous vote for the SES by the Regions [of Ukraine faction] does not chime in with the strategic interests of Mr Yanukovych. Yet how independent they once seemed: they could even have saved political reform, but declined to do so.

If he had really been strong and independent, Yanukovych himself could have made a couple of criticisms about the economic aspects of the SES, even those that had already been agreed on. In the eyes of his electorate, avid not so much for recognition of Russian as a state language as for a "strong hand", that would have gone down well. But no. Now it is a matter of guesswork: either Yanukovych really will have to "throw himself under a tank" - he is now on a lead. Or maybe the prime minister's recent visit to Moscow, where he apparently had the honour of beholding the Almighty, has made some impact... [ellipsis as published]. In any case, the myth of the tough and independent leader is starting to crack noticeably. Are we answerable for those who domesticate us?

NO CONFLICT OF INTEREST

But what happened yesterday at the Supreme Council appeared the most inexplicable thing. The discussion was, of course, quite stormy. Our Ukraine and the Communists once again denounced each other's anti-Ukrainian nature. Incidentally, no one is surprised, for some reason, that such accusations are most commonly swapped by the country's two most popular political forces, whose ideology (even allowing for the "Yushchenko phenomenon") is shared by half of all Ukrainians. That, after all, is a further indication of the fact that the Ukrainians themselves do not know in what country they want to live. It is also another argument that benefits the SES builders inside and outside Ukraine, who are sincerely amazed, almost like [the Russian writer Mikhail] Bulgakov, at what sort of country Ukraine is... [ellipsis as published].

At the same time, the heat of the debates has turned out to be less than what many expected - especially in contrast with the recent discussion of political reform, in which Viktor Yushchenko himself shook the imagination by the fiery nature of his speech. This time, there were also fiery and witty speeches from the opposition, but there were none that made it clear that these people had no way back. Nor was there any blocking of the rostrum. This latter point can be explained by saying that, this time, unlike the vote on political reform, the ability of the majority MPs and the Communists to muster the necessary number of votes was not in doubt, and they had no need to resort to any falsifications.

On the other hand, the opposition did not try to use the controversial elections in Mukacheve as an excuse for blocking the rostrum, as had been feared, the day before yesterday, by Oleksandr Zadorozhniy, the president's permanent representative in the Supreme Council, for example. The faction leaders simply sat down and reached an agreement: the opposition would behave calmly, and, after the SES vote, Interior Ministry and Security Service leaders would report to parliament on the events in Mukacheve. Admittedly, the leaders turned out to be only deputy heads and so, naturally, said nothing in plain terms (although, through their contradictory statements, they provided the necessary material for the opposition media).

All this enabled Stepan Havrysh to speak, after the vote, about "those who imitated resistance". It is hard to say how much irritation there was here over the actions and, most importantly, over the words of the opposition (in the lobbies, the opposition frequently switched to personalities, particularly where Mr Havrysh was concerned). But there is an element of truth here, unless the opposition's victory over political reform, which was, nevertheless, delivered primarily by good organizational work in its own ranks and those of the "enemy", was an unrepeatable accident.

"But why, then?" The simplest answer is because even the most "pro-Western" opposition cannot afford to seriously annoy the Kremlin. Then the SES and everything else are, essentially, just the legitimization of the status quo in bilateral relations. But there is a further reason. Very, very many - and certainly not just in the opposition - hope that, in the future, it will be possible to "bail out" of the agreements foisted on Kuchma by Putin. After all, the most sensational decision of this convocation of parliament was adopted fairly quietly.

In the end, out of pride, the MPs did not even want to postpone the vote, although such a draft resolution was also to hand. How could we? The poor State Duma had tired of waiting for the Ukrainian parliamentarians to finish their endless talking. (The Duma MPs ratified the SES immediately after the Supreme Council MPs. They waited so that everything would happen on one and the same day, as the presidents had agreed... [ellipsis as published]).

As was said at the beginning of the article, the ratified SES treaty has a single proviso - about the need to observe the Ukrainian constitution. But who will establish whether a particular aspect of the creation or the activities of the SES is in accordance with our basic law? Only the Constitutional Court has that right, and many people have doubts about its impartiality. It is not surprising that the "recipes" of the overt and covert opponents of the SES boil down to the need for a change at the top. But will it actually happen? Will the new authorities display the required political will? When all is said and done, will it not simply be too late to revise individual provisions, treaties or agreements, of which there may be a large number within the SES framework?

The whole difference between the Ukrainian and Russian mentalities lies, evidently, in the attitude towards the famous "maybe" [Russian: "avos"]. For Russians, it means doing something without thinking. For us, it means thinking and then doing nothing.

The SES treaty is now a historical fact, retaining absolutely all the potential threats and shortcomings for Ukraine, including some for the specific economic and political interests of the people who directly or indirectly supported it.

So far, they have only one reply to this - "maybe it will happen" [i.e. "maybe it won't happen"].