By Oleksandr Moroz, Leader, Socialist Party of Ukraine
Silski Visti, Kiev, Ukraine, in Ukrainian, 17 Feb 04; p 2
BBC Monitoring Service, UK, in English, Feb 27, 2004

The following is the text of the article by Oleksandr Moroz, entitled "Neutralize intentions to rig the presidential election!" and published in Silski Visti on 17 February; subheadings inserted editorially:

In analysing the political situation that has to do with the presidential elections and all the previous practices of power formation, one can reach a conclusion that the regime's main tool to achieve its aim can only be falsification. In this connection there are so many arguments that this premise can be taken for granted.

Let us forecast possible actions by the regime's supporters, meaning the best conditions for using the criminal tool. Our experience makes it possible to conclude that practically the only scenario for successful vote-rigging (successful for the regime) is to hold a presidential election in August this year. Let us examine reasons for such a forecast.

EARLY PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

Reasons. It is easier to falsify things by taking advantage of large masses of those who do not want to or cannot take part in elections. Then, there is a lot of room for manipulation. By-elections and other campaigns, general statistics on the movement of people on holidays reduce the electoral turnout rate by approximately 20 per cent. So, the regime's spin doctors could count on elections in August when holidays are at their height.

Ways to legitimize early elections. The only way is to have an early election of the president. The key to this is Leonid Kuchma's voluntary resignation. Such an assumption might seem illogical, for the motives he voiced for political reforms throughout one and half years have demonstrated a strengthening of the dictatorship, not his concern for the democratization of state governance. Has his interest changed now? Certainly not. Yet he will not be able to carry out his intention on his own. The risks are too high because even the universal use of government machinery cannot be a guarantee.

Besides, he does not need power in itself; he needs it as a condition of security (in a broad sense of these words). Voluntary resignation, to some extent, improves the president's image: look, kind people, I truly want change, do not want to hinder it, you should somehow manage on your own... [newspaper ellipsis] Soft-hearted ordinary people love things like these. Yet not everything is so simple because the content of political reform is not clear. So, two scenarios seem likely. Either of them can be implemented.

POWER-FOR-SECURITY TRADE-OFF

The first scenario. Reform is not carried out. Power should be transferred to that person who will guarantee the president's security either personally (having such authority) or by ensuring him [Kuchma] respective status. As regards status, for example, the post of prime minister (which is less likely) or MP will be suitable. It is no problem to vacate such a position for the president. A successor to the presidency can expect success if he a) enjoys Kuchma's confidence, based on previous relations; b) has a sufficient level of publicity. In other words, a person whom people know and on whose potential they place their hopes.

[Prime Minister] Viktor Yanukovych meets these criteria more than anyone, though the name is not that important. The current prime minister's advantage is that, under the present constitution, presidential authority and the ability to use government machinery would go to him if Kuchma resigned. Yanukovych would have enough arguments for those who are in charge of administrative resources - [regional] governors. Under the constitution early elections should be held 90 days after the current president leaves office. In other words, an "abdication" can be expected in late April-early May.

CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE SCENARIO

The second scenario. Reform is carried out. In this case the content and timing of constitution changes play a great role. There are quite a few possible sequences, and they can be analysed separately. One of them is that reform comes into effect 15 days after it is signed into law. If this happens in late March, in a few days power may be transferred either according to the first scenario or, following the agreement with the prime minister (whose authority will be augmented), to another representative of the authorities with a more or less untarnished reputation ([National Bank governor] Serhiy Tyhypko, etc.). Most likely, the president has not yet chosen this scenario.

This scenario is "passable". It does not disturb society because competition between contenders would get a bit less sharp while control over the parliamentary majority remains in the same hands. This scenario requires that constitutional amendments be passed not later than March. (If this is the case, bills on elections and other bills having to do with reform will not be much disputed by the parliamentary majority).

Back-up scenario. It seems it was not by chance that the majority, which had various possibilities to abide by parliamentary procedure, voted [on a bill on constitutional changes] on 24 December 2003 in an illegitimate fashion [by a show of hands]. Neither was it accidental that it received an order to hold an emergency session only on the latest, to some extent, ambiguous date, on the eve of 3 February. What was this done for? So that, in response to MPs' appeals, the Constitutional Court would rule the votes on the aforementioned days illegitimate. The authorities will need such a ruling after the presidential election when it becomes clear to the regime whether the president's power should be enhanced or weakened.

Both the model of the president's election and the duration of the presidential campaign will matter in each scenario. It is not coincidental that the latter factor is repeatedly mentioned by the propresidential forces which are allegedly worried that parliamentary elections are held for 90 days and presidential elections are held for 180 days, though they are not directly interrelated. It is a different thing that worries them.

There are two reasons. First, it is intended to diminish the opposition candidates' chances of using old methods of campaigning and canvassing because the up-to-date methods, especially television, are in the regime's hands. In pursuit of this aim attempts are made to close the Silski Visti newspaper, to take Radio Liberty off the air, to bring the regional mass media under control. Second, it is intended to create grounds for the plausible disqualification of that candidate (candidates) whose actions could be qualified as violation of electoral laws in terms of premature campaigning.

It is for this reason that there were delays in proposing candidates for a new make-up of the Central Electoral Commission. The candidates were selected taking account of the second reason mentioned here, with a view to resorting to this method. This is a general outline of conditions for likely vote-rigging.

OPPOSITION CAN THWART PRESIDENT'S SCHEMES

How to neutralize these plans? The first scenario (as well as the second) could be, to a large extent, neutralized by the quality of the law on presidential elections which should necessarily provide that the state administration shall be distanced from the electoral process.

The third scenario could be blocked by several measures. First of all, it is necessary to make the Constitutional Court send its reply as to the legitimacy of the votes on 24 December and 3 February, as well as hand down its ruling on the law on constitution changes. It does not matter whether its replies will be positive or negative, but their existence will later preclude manipulation or fraud, and the Constitutional Court will not be held hostage to the regime.

Next, it is necessary to carefully think over the dates of the passage of the bill on constitutional changes. To prevent anybody from doing stupid things, the best of all would be to finally vote on the bill in June. The nearest weeks will show if the political forces have mutual confidence as to the reform of the power system. If it is sufficient, a June vote will not be risky even provided the presidential campaign is shortened. The response of the pro-regime structures to this circumstance will prove if the forecast that has been made is right or wrong.

There are also other mechanisms to keep everyone within the framework of the constitution. They are not at issue. Today the forecast I have made suggests that leaders of groups and factions of the parliamentary majority need to analyse their place and role in spin doctors' moves to keep the regime in place, and consequences for themselves. The same is true for other leaders from progovernment structures. I am certain they will not find their interest in the developed scenario.

Leaders of the opposition factions need to act in a concerted and coordinated fashion and to step over the differences that have recently been accumulated, especially in view of the fact that many of the differences have been planted. The regime can make a good job of deceiving its opponents and intriguing.

Active elements in political parties should consider new nuances in the development of political processes, mobilize the entire arsenal of their own means, paying special attention to the need to explain things to people. More than ever, citizens and each voter will be increasingly responsible for forming the authorities, thus for the situation in the state. Many other factors, including external factors, should also be considered.

What about the president? He can either refute what has been said above or keep silent. In fact, this is one of the motives behind the publication of this forecast.

We shall see. Then together we will make our own conclusions.