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OP-ED, By Ihor Losiv
Kyiv Post, Kyiv, Ukraine, Feb 26, 2004
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By leaving Crimean Ukrainians to the mercy of fate, Kyiv significantly
limited its influence in the autonomous republic.
Chilean poet Pablo Neruda, vacationing in Crimea and impressed by its
vistas, called the peninsula a medal on the earth's chest. Now, as we mark
the 50th anniversary of Crimea's becoming part of the Ukrainian Soviet
republic, eventually to become part of independent Ukraine, we should
reflect on what Crimea means for Ukraine, and vice versa.
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Demonstrators demand that Crimea, if not all of Ukraine, revert to
Russia while celebrating 350 years of the Pereyaslav Treaty, Jan. 17 in
Kyiv [Oleksy Boyko]
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You can hardly find another territory in Ukraine where so many
civilizations, cultures and nations took turns in power. A powerful magnet,
Crimea attracted Greeks, Scythians, Sarmats, Goths, Slavs, Turks and Italian
Genoans. The Crimean-Tatar nation has for centuries been developing out of
this ethnic conglomerate.
After 1917, an autonomous Soviet Republic within the Russian Soviet
Federation was founded in Crimea.
After the deportation of the Tatars in 1944, by order of Stalin, Molotov and
Beria, the peninsula turned from a blossoming land into a desert. The local
agricultural system was completely destroyed. Russians who were
systematically brought there were unable to farm in Crimea's conditions. By
the way, most of Crimea's population consists of people who came to the
peninsula after 1944.
Crimea had to be revived. Party officials decided to do so at Ukraine's
expense, given that Ukrainians had a reputation for being industrious and
experienced farmers, and that Crimea was territorially close to Ukraine and
the Dnipro's water resources.
The procedure for passing Crimea over to the Ukrainian republic was
completed in a perfectly legal way. The parliament of the Russian Federation
applied to the parliament of the Ukrainian republic requesting that it
accept Crimea into its territory. Kyiv agreed.
It's worth mentioning that no protests took place, and no discontent about
the change manifested itself among either the Russian or Ukrainian
populations.
When Russian separatists call this 1954 event into question today, they
argue that there was no referendum. But it wasn't the legal practice of the
USSR to hold referendums. In 1926, without any referendum, the Russian
and Ukrainian republics' territory was divided, with Ukraine losing at least
70,000 square kilometers (three times more than Crimea itself!) of its
ethnic lands to Russia, on which Ukrainians totaled between 60 to 90
percent of the population.
Often, identification of the ethnic makeup on these frontier territories was
done like so: A Chekist (secret policeman) would come in, put a Mauser on
the table and blandly ask the host "Are you Russian or Petlura's?" The
Ukrainian cities of Tahanrih and Shakhty were incorporated into Russia by a
resolution of Communist Party officials.
After 1954, Ukraine invested heavily in Crimea to revive its agriculture,
resort infrastructure, transportation system and communications
technologies. The Northern Crimean canal that brought water to the dry
Crimean soil was built.
Crimea evidently still needs Ukraine as a significant economic player.
That's
what all serious people on the peninsula understand. Crimean Tatars
realize that, with all their pretensions, Ukrainian authorities treat their
problems much more conscientiously than Russia would. The events in
Chechnya perfectly demonstrate the Russian style of handling complicated
interethnic conflicts.
Russians in Crimea, whether consciously or not, give due credit for the fact
that, for the last 12 very hard years, Ukraine has managed not to allow any
bloody ethnic conflicts in such a geopolitically and ethnically troubled
region as Crimea. Crimea's population is now 58 percent Russian, 27
percent Ukrainian and 12 percent Crimean Tatar.
But it should be recalled that, in the independence referendum in 1991, 54
percent of Crimeans said "yes" to Ukrainian independence, including 57
percent in the old Soviet navy city of Sevastopol. Seventy-eight percent of
sailors and officers in the then-Soviet navy voted for it.
It should be stated that Crimean separatism, unlike that of Prydnistrovia,
Abkhazia and Northern Ossetia, is assisted mainly from outside Ukraine. If
Moscow stops feeding the numerous pro-Russian organizations in Crimea, and
local anti-Ukrainian publications, we would be able to forget about Crimean
separatism. On Feb. 19 of this year, fewer than 200 persons turned out to
protest Crimea's Ukrainian status. The weak reaction of the native Russian
press and the pro-Russian press in Crimea helped account for that. There was
no powerful impulse from Moscow.
Since returning to their motherland, most Crimean Tatars have taken a
distinctly pro-Ukrainian stance, which of course annoys Russian chauvinists.
However, Tatars are disappointed that Kyiv, in its attempt to flirt with
Moscow, often takes its cue too much from pro-Russian forces.
Kyiv simply doesn't promote the Ukrainian community's interests in Crimea.
There are three times as many Crimean Tatar schools on the peninsula than
there are Ukrainian ones. Crimean Ukrainians are the world's mostly
forgotten and neglected Ukrainian Diaspora.
By leaving Crimean Ukrainians to the mercy of fate, Kyiv significantly
limited its influence in the autonomous republic. Crimea is the key to the
whole country. It's Ukraine's chance to control the south, its Black Sea
coast and its status as a ocean-faring country.
Crimea represents Ukraine's political role in the Black Sea and
Mediterranean Sea basins; it's the country's sole guarantee of territorial
stability. Ukraine needs Crimea no less that Crimea needs Ukraine. Crimea
is a true medal on Ukraine's chest, a heavy medal that it has to bear,
despite
its weight.
Ihor Losiv teaches at the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy and is
science editor of the journal Sea Power. Translated by Valentyna Kolesnyk.
LINK: http://www.kyivpost.com/opinion/oped/20801/
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