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VIEW FROM CANADA
By Roman Serbyn, PhD, Professor, Department of History,
University of Quebec, Montreal, Quebec, Canada
ROMYR Report, Political Analysis Quarterly, FALL, 2002, No. 14
Romyr & Associates, Kyiv, Ukraine; Toronto, Ontario; New York, NY
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To some degree, all countries draw on their history for
ideological and political aims. Post-colonial and newly independent
countries are no exception. Each is faced with the task of building a vital
state and forming a robust, national identity. Thus, it is no surprise that
the current Ukrainian leadership chooses to focus attention on those
historical events that fundamentally influenced the fate of the Ukrainian
people and became deeply engraved in its collective memory. While the
leaders designate these occasions for official commemorations, the
particular selection of events is curiously eclectic. Such a perplexing
slate of memorials leads to questions on how these occasions contribute to
efforts to consolidate the vision of an independent and democratic
Ukrainian nation and society.
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"Famine is Ravaging In Ukraine' T. Shevchenko"
Poster by Heorhiy Shevtsov, 1993
(Click on images to enlarge them)
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This year [2002], Chernihiv celebrated the 200th anniversary of
the Chernihiv gubernia, the creation of which signified the intensifying
integration of Ukrainian lands with the Russian Empire, the loss of the last
vestiges of Cossack autonomy, and the expansion of serfdom. Next year,
Ukraine marks the 85th anniversary of the birth of Volodymyr Shcherbytsky,
notorious for his unyielding struggle against all manifestations of
Ukrainian independence and his attempts to Russify the language, the
culture, indeed, the soul of the Ukrainian people. Any beneficial influence
on the patriotic edification of young Ukrainians is unlikely to spring from
glorification of past tsarist and Soviet control. The only comfort to be
gained from these dubious jubilees is the fact that they are low-key events
unlikely to mold notions of heritage among contemporary Ukrainians.
However, three high-profile commemorations planned for the near
future will have substantial significance for the spiritual development of
Ukraine. This year marks the 70th anniversary of the Famine-Genocide of
1932-1933. In 2004, Ukraine plans to commemorate the 350th anniversary of
the Cossack Council of Pereiaslav (1654). The following year is the 60th
anniversary of the victory over Germany. Ukraine celebrates Victory Day
every year, and its 60th anniversary will be a culmination of all previous
commemorations. Therefore, we will leave a review of this annual holiday for
last.
First, we examine the Famine-Genocide and the Pereiaslav
Council. The decrees of Leonid Kuchma, the president of Ukraine, serve as
our point of departure from which we examine the ideology behind the
Ukrainian government plans to mark the events.
NOTE: Both decrees may be found on the president's Web site:
Analysis of these two documents reveals the president signed the
decree "On the Commemoration of the 350th Anniversary of the Pereiaslav
Cossack Council of 1654" on 13 March 2002. One week later, on 20 March
2002, he signed the decree "On the Measures Connected with the 70th
Anniversary of the Death by Starvation in Ukraine." Thus, almost two years
were allotted for the preparations of the anniversary of the Pereiaslav
Council (January 1654), whereas barely six months were allocated to plan
for the autumn anniversary of the Famine-Genocide.
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Compounding the timeframe discrepancy, the decree regarding
commemoration of the Pereiaslav Council designated an existing
organizational committee to drive the planning process. Twenty-two men
representing political and academic spheres and headed by the former chief
of the Presidential Administration and current Speaker of Parliament,
Volodymyr Lytvyn form this prestigious committee. Meanwhile, the
organizational committee for the anniversary of the Famine-Genocide, which
was supposed to be headed by the prime minister, was yet to be selected at
the time the decree was issued. The Cabinet of Ministers was supposed to
ratify its schedule within two months.
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Famine Seal
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In reality, consultation with the Committee on State Building
revealed that appropriate materials for planning the anniversary had been
submitted to the cabinet only in late October of this year. Thus,
ratification cannot be expected sooner than early November leaving barely a
month before the start of the anniversary. The apathy towards the
Famine-Genocide project versus the hearty approach to the Pereiaslav event
will likely be reflected in the quality, content, and production of the
ceremonies.
In the decrees we find not only striking differences but also
fundamental discrepancies in the treatment of these historical events.
Whereas both decrees encourage scholarly conferences, round tables, and
thematic campaigns in the mass media, competition "among pupils . for the
top history student" will inexplicably be organized only around the topic of
the Pereiaslav Council. The "publication of monographs, scholarly-popular
and artistic literature on historical themes" is limited to material
connected with Pereiaslav. Similarly, the decree makes no mention of asking
experts to research and record the wealth of historical testimony that could
be provided by the aging eyewitnesses to the Famine-Genocide. That task
is left to elementary and high school pupils. (No mention was made of
university students.)
The Cossack council celebration will provide the impetus for a
"restoration of exhibits" in the "National Museum of History of Ukraine and
the Pereiaslav National Historical-Ethnographic Preserve."
In contrast, the students' collection of documents and
depositions related to the Famine-Genocide will be designated only "for
supplementing the funds of regional museums." The decree makes no mention
of presenting the Famine-Genocide in the main museums of Ukraine, nor does
it broach the establishment of a state museum dedicated to the subject.
The presidential decrees pose a number of fundamental problems.
In the 1930s Soviet Ukraine became the victim of one of the worst genocides
in history. To this day, neither the president nor the Verkhovna Rada has
recognized this as mass murder that was planned and executed by Soviet
authorities who created an artificial famine as genocide against the
Ukrainian people. The Ukrainian government has still not identified the
criminals responsible for this crime against humanity.
A fitting tribute to the victims of this crime would be:
1) An official condemnation by the Ukrainian leadership of this heinous act
and the criminals who were responsible for it;
2) A joint, solemn recognition by all branches of the Ukrainian
leadership-the president, government, and Verkhovna Rada-"of the genocide
against the Ukrainian people," one that applies appropriate and accepted
terms. (NOTE: by avoiding the word "genocide" and by using the phrase "in
Ukraine," the decree displays disrespect towards the victims of the
genocide.
In the first place, only Slavs understand the Ukrainian word
Holodomor [death by starvation], which, for some reason, is not capitalized
in the document, and even Slavs do not necessarily equate this word with
genocide. Secondly, by saying "in Ukraine" rather than "the Ukrainian
people" the focus of the injustice incorrectly lands on the place where the
evil was perpetrated rather than on the victims of the genocide, the
Ukrainian people.)
In failing to pay appropriate homage to the memory of the
famine's victims, museums and state institutions discredit themselves and
do a disservice to the public. A careful reading of the decrees may explain
why scholarly scrutiny of the subject is glaringly absent. There is a stark
contrast between conflicting legacies.
Commemorating the Famine-Genocide represents a monumental
condemnation of the Soviet legacy that Ukrainian leaders glorify every year
on Victory Day. The imprint of the USSR, the "Soviet fatherland," is clearly
stamped on the most terrible pages of Ukrainian history: the
Famine-Genocide, the destruction of Ukrainian statehood, and the
annihilation of the Ukrainian nationality.
Another version of Soviet heritage presents that regime as the
savior of the Ukrainian nation from Hitler's Germany and the source of the
present Ukrainian state. Given this dichotomy, it is more emotionally
wrenching for the present Ukrainian leadership, nurtured in the Soviet
spirit and traditions, to organize the 70th anniversary of the
Famine-Genocide than the 60th anniversary of the victory over the Germans.
Thus, the 350th anniversary of the Pereiaslav Council, more ideologically in
tune with Soviet tradition, is closer to the heart of the Presidential
Administration.
The decree on the commemoration of the Pereiaslav Council makes
clear that the leadership is intent on treating this anniversary in a joyful
rather than funereal manner. If establishing the historical truth about this
controversial event mattered to the president, it would be unnecessary to
organize civic jubilees since there is no doubt today that the enslavement
of Ukraine by the Muscovite tsardom began in Pereiaslav. Only imperialists
could turn the tragic memory of this council into a noble vision of the
"re-unification" of two "fraternal peoples." Behind the seemingly neutral
wording, the decree masks the peculiar spectacle of today's Ukrainian
leaders celebrating events that led to its people being enslaved for three
hundred years.
The Ukrainian leadership is preparing for the commemoration of
"Victory Day" well in advance and with great enthusiasm. As early as August
14, 2002, President Kuchma signed a decree entitled "On the
Historical-Commemorative Series The Books of Remembrance of Ukraine,"
calling for the publication of a second, expanded Bezsmertia [Immortality]
compilation and other commemorative books about the "Sixtieth anniversary of
Victory in the Great Patriotic War." Six weeks later, Prime Minister
Anatolii Kinakh informed veterans that "Ukraine is commencing large-scale
celebrations of this great holiday" within the framework of the CIS.
The Ukrainian leadership's ardent attitude towards the Soviet
empire's colonialism is astonishing. The fact of the matter is that, in the
course of fifty years, the Soviet regime transformed the distorted history
of the German-Soviet conflict into a powerful ideological myth of the "Great
Patriotic War." The paradox of Ukrainian devotion to the traditions of
"Victory Day" is that the myth, the main component of which became this
celebration, was aimed at consolidating a multi-national empire around the
ruling Communist Party. In its essence, such fabled devotion ran counter to
Ukrainian aspirations for independence.
This myth reached its zenith of popularity in Brezhnev's time. A
museum of the "Great Patriotic War" was built in Kyiv, and numerous
monuments, memorial markers, etc., appeared throughout Ukraine. These
measures fueled the notion of an eternally united Soviet people, a concept
that was forged on the battlefields of World War II where a strong and
forceful alliance was required drive out an external enemy and liberate a
common fatherland. New generations grew up influenced by this fiction, their
knowledge of the war limited by what they were taught in school, shown in
museums, and imbued with during state holidays. Historical truth awaited the
collapse of the Communist Party, the exercise of freedom of expression, and
the opening of historical archives.
Now we know that there was no nationwide rush on the part of the
Ukrainian population to the defense of the Communist regime - not in western
Ukraine, which had suffered during the two-year Soviet occupation between
1939 and 1941, nor in eastern Ukraine, which had been starved to death
during the great Famine. Nazi brutality gave rise to popular resistance in
Ukraine, but with no enthusiasm for the return of the Stalinist regime.
In contrast to prevailing folklore, the Red Army did not
liberate the Ukrainian people. "To liberate," means to grant freedom, but a
totalitarian system cannot bring freedom to anyone; it is capable only of
replacing one type of slavery with another. Finally, Hitler's defeat did not
make victors out of the Soviet people. They were, according to Josef Stalin,
simple "cogs in a great machine." Only Stalin and his henchmen ended up
reaping the fruits of victory.
The pernicious nature of the falsehoods surrounding the "Great
Patriotic War" lays not only its distorted historical foundation
(particularly in connection with Ukraine). The very ideology on which this
lie is constructed is contrary to Ukrainian statehood and Ukrainian
identity. It
still divides Ukrainian society into so-called "victors" (veterans of the
Soviet
Army and Red partisans) and "vanquished" (veterans of the Ukrainian
Insurgent
Army (UPA), and everyone who fought against the Stalinist regime).
The champions of this myth have internalized ideological
barriers within Ukraine, much to the astonishment of a civilized world that
long
ago reconciled former military rivalries. Finally, this myth provides a
basis
for opponents of Ukrainian statehood, loyalists who long for the return of
the
Soviet Union, or, perhaps, hope to see Ukraine folded into a greater Eastern
Slavic, but essentially Russian, state.
The 60th anniversary of the end of the Second World War will be
commemorated throughout the entire world. Ukraine was one of the main arenas
of this conflict and suffered immeasurably as two of history's most vile
regimes collided on its. Today, Ukrainian leaders bear a moral
responsibility to produce a worthy commemoration of this sad history. At
long
last, Ukraine needs to expose the whole truth about wartime events on its
territory;
the facts about all the crimes committed against Ukrainians and the
criminals who
perpetrated those appalling acts.
Ukrainian participation in the Second World War should be
re-considered from new perspectives recalling that the state was tormented
and throttled by two totalitarian empires. For that reason, modern Ukraine
should encourage all the veterans of the war to be regarded respectfully, no
matter to which side of the conflict fate may have cast them. No longer
should veterans be divided into "victors" and "vanquished."
Rather, they should be invited to sit at one table, as brothers
in arms. Only then will the divisive overtones of "Victory Day" be replaced
with the conciliatory language of a "Day of Remembrance." To make this
possible, the Ukrainian leadership will have to repudiate the vestiges of
Soviet ideology, particularly the anti-Ukrainian jingoism of the "Great
Patriotic War."
The first edition of Bezsmertia mentioned above, dedicated to
the 55th anniversary of the "Victory," cites an inspiring declaration by
Leonid Kuchma: those who once occupied one set of trenches and today have
landed on different sides of the border will never be on different sides of
the barricades. It would be an honorable act on the part of the President of
Ukraine if, on the eve of the 60th anniversary of the end of the Second
World War, he would dismantle the ideological barricades in his own country.
Before harmonizing Ukrainian history textbooks with Russian
ones, as the Ukrainian government recently proposed, the state must first
revise officially financed publications by including facts that have been
proved by history scholars. Thus, the second edition of Bezsmertia should
emphasize a cleansing purge of falsehoods over supplemental verbiage. The
editors of the first compilation were well aware that in describing the UPA
as "hirelings of fascist Germany" allegedly fighting only against the Soviet
Union they were spreading tired lies, insulting champions of Ukrainian
independence, and reinforcing internal divisions within the country.
The further development of a full-fledged Ukrainian society and
the building of a democratic state will depend in great measure on a
rethinking of the vast historical scope and the rich spiritual legacy with
which history has endowed the Ukrainian people. The country's intelligentsia
and leadership must play a vital role in this regard by unearthing the truth
and offering evidence to support it and working to disseminate it.
Anniversaries of important historical dates are fitting
occasions for reflection on a nation's past. In marking such events, a free,
independent, and modern Ukraine should be intent on building a genuine
respect for its true history rather than perpetuating imposed fiction.
[Fall, 2002}
ROMYR REPORT, Political Analysis Quarterly, Fall, 2002, Kyiv, Ukraine
http://www.intelex.ca/romyrreport/index.php?module=ContentExpress&func=displ
ay&bid=18&mid=180&ceid=169; www.romyr.com
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