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SOURCE. Michael Ellman, "Soviet Repression Statistics: Some
Comments," Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 54 No. 7, November 2002,
pp. 1151-72
Johnson's Russia List (JRL)
JRL Research and Analaytical Supplement
Editor: Stephen D. Shenfield
Issue No. 15, January 2003
By Stephen D. Shenfield:
One long-running scholarly debate that up to now I have not felt
inspired to mention in the Research and Analytical Supplement
(RAS) concerns the statistics of Soviet (mainly Stalin-era) political
repression. How big was the Gulag? How many people were sent
to the camps and how many perished there? How many were shot?
The main antagonists in this debate have been:
* Stephen Wheatcroft, a former colleague of mine at the University
of Birmingham (England) Centre for Russian and East European
Studies, currently at the University of Melbourne (Australia), and
* Robert Conquest, senior research fellow and scholar-curator
of the Russia and CIS Collection at the Hoover Institution
(Stanford University) and author of many highly acclaimed works
on Soviet repression (1)
On the surface the debate has revolved around the choice and
interpretation of statistical sources. Wheatcroft prefers to rely on
the official Soviet data that have become available in greater
abundance as archives have opened up, while Conquest continues
to put more trust in unofficial "literary" sources such as
"guesstimates" presented by former prisoners in their memoirs.
However, the passion with which often abstruse statistical
issues are argued points to another much more political clash not
far beneath the surface. Conquest suspects that Wheatcroft favors
the relatively low official figures because he is an apologist for the
Soviet system, perhaps even for Stalin. Wheatcroft naturally finds
Conquest's imputations on this score highly offensive.
The intervention that Michael Ellman of the University of
Amsterdam has now made in this rather barren debate is most
balanced and constructive. (2) On the one hand, he agrees with
Wheatcroft that the worm's eye views of ex-prisoners cannot form
the basis of an accurate global assessment. On the other hand,
he demonstrates how a sufficiently critical interpretation of the
official data yields results fully compatible with the qualitative
picture so eloquently portrayed in Conquest's works.
Crucial is the distinction that Ellman draws between the Gulag's
relatively modest "stocks" and its much greater "flows." "Only"
a few million people were prisoners in the Gulag at any one time
(at the end of 1940, "only" 1.5 million); nonetheless turnover was
so high that according to the author's estimate "in the 27 years of
the Gulag's existence (1930-56) the number of people who were
sentenced to detention in prisons, colonies and camps was 17-18
million." (3)
Like Wheatcroft and several Russian researchers, Ellman concludes
that the number of "repression deaths" in 1937 and 1938, the peak
years of the great terror, was about one million (more precisely, in
the range 950,000--1,200,000). Most of these deaths were deliberate
NKVD killings ("executions"), deaths in detention accounting for the
remainder.
But although this is the best numerical estimate obtainable, it omits
an important hidden category -- deaths that occurred after release
but were caused by detention in the Gulag. Of the 644,000 people
recorded as being released from the Gulag in 1937-38, how many
died shortly afterward as a direct result of the way they were treated
there? We do not know, but the number must be very substantial
because it was common practice to release from camp prisoners
who were no longer strong and healthy enough to work. This
improved the camp's indicators for both mortality and labor
productivity. (4)
The author points out that despite the large number of people
repressed the demographic impact of repression was less than that
of war, famine, and disease, especially in the periods with the highest
rates of excess deaths (1918-23, 1931-34, and 1941-45).
Or should the victims of repression and of famine be lumped together,
counting them all as victims of the regime? Ellman discusses this
controversial question in an appendix and concludes that the right
answer is no. There is insufficient evidence to prove that Stalin
deliberately sought the starvation of millions of peasants, although
he was unwilling to come to their aid at the expense of goals more
important to him, such as exporting grain to pay for the import of
machinery. Such callousness had precedents in the history of China,
India (under the British Raj), and other countries.
NOTES
(1) Most important in this context is "The Great Terror" (Macmillan,
1968), later updated as "The Great Terror: A Reassessment (Oxford
University Press, 1990). Also highly pertinent is his book on c
ollectivization: "Harvest of Sorrow" (Oxford University Press, 1986).
(2) Preceding articles in this debate appeared in the following issues
of "Europe-Asia Studies": December 1996, November 1997, March
1999, September 1999, December 1999, September 2000.
(3) He notes that "this figure excludes the deportees, prisoners
of war and internees, those in the post-war filtration camps, and
those who performed forced labor at their normal place of work."
(4) The ploy did not always work. The decision to release some
prisoners came too late. One woman was summoned to come collect
her father who was to be released, but by the time she reached the
camp he was already dead. This cannot have been an unusual
experience.
Johnson's Russia List, #7022, 17 January 2003
davidjohnson@erols.com, A CDI Project, www.cdi.org
JRL RESEARCH AND ANALYTICAL SUPPLEMENT (RAS)
Editor: Stephen D. Shenfield, shenfield@neaccess.net
Issue No. 15, January 2003
For back issues go to the RAS archive at:
http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/jrl-ras.cfm
SOURCE. Michael Ellman, "Soviet Repression Statistics: Some
Comments," Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 54 No. 7, November 2002,
pp. 1151-72.
To read Michael Ellman's article in full go to the following URL:
http://www.artukraine.com/famineart/SovietCrimes.pdf
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