By Taras Kuzio
The Kyiv Post, OPINION
Kyiv, Ukraine
Dec 19, 2002 17:22

Nine months after the parliamentary elections, Viktor Yushchenko's two-pronged tactics of creating a democratic parliamentary majority based on Our Ukraine and selected oligarch groups while pressing for a Polish-style round-table between the opposition and authorities have clearly failed. The takeover of the government and parliament by pro-presidential forces that was completed on Dec. 17 has left Our Ukraine completely sidelined. If his tactics had worked, Yushchenko would have been applauded as the leader who moved Ukraine into the post-Leonid Kuchma era. Instead, it is Yushchenko's failures of leadership that are now coming under the spotlight.

Stalemate

Although the pro-presidential forces have gained the upper hand since the elections, this victory is unlikely to be long lasting. Ukraine's regional and ethno-cultural divisions are such that the battle between pro-presidential oligarchs and the opposition is bound to end in stalemate. Neither side is strong enough to force its opponents into unconditional surrender. This rules out the formation of a typical CIS authoritarian state, as some oligarchs, Kuchma, and Russia would probably prefer, or a breakthrough by national democratic reformist forces, which the West would prefer.

In order to achieve a breakthrough, the ruling oligarchic clans or the opposition would have to be united. This is not likely. While Russia's "party of power" Yedinstvo has stuck together since the December 1999 elections to the State Duma, the For a United Ukraine bloc disintegrated into seven factions after the election, despite promises it would be transformed into a party to be led by Kuchma.

Meanwhile, the opposition is divided into moderates and radicals. While the Socialists and Tymoshenko's bloc are clearly radicals, Yushchenko's Our Ukraine is divided between statists willing to work with some oligarchic centrists and radical reformers closer to Tymoshenko. The Communists have also demonstrated themselves to be moderates by their willingness to reach an accommodation with the executive and oligarchs whenever they felt they had to. However, most members of Our Ukraine are ready to cooperate with the two radical groups but not with the Communists, due to their unreconstructed hardline ideology. When such a plan for cooperation was proposed recently by Our Ukraine, the Socialists and Tymoshenko both rejected it.

In his speech commemorating the famine of 1932-33 last month, Kuchma played on these divisions, asking how the national democrats could ever cooperate with the Communist party that unleashed the famine. He neglected to mention that he himself was a member of the party until 1991. A subsequent decree outlined plans for a monument to the victims of the famine and Communist crimes as well as a research centre. These plans may have had less to do with Kuchma's sincere interest in rectifying Soviet crimes than with fomenting divisions in the opposition.

Ratings

At their peak, national democrats could count on upwards of a third of the vote in presidential and parliamentary elections. In the December 1991 presidential elections, the five national democratic candidates obtained a combined total of 34.2 percent, including 23.2 percent for Rukh leader Vyacheslav Chornovil. The national democrats subsequently lost popularity, reaching a low point in the March 1998 parliamentary elections, when the still-united Rukh, the Forward Ukraine bloc, Reforms and Order and the Republican Christian Party together polled only 14.8 percent.

In the March elections, Our Ukraine received 23.56 percent of the party-list vote nationwide and was the most popular force in 14 western, central and north-eastern oblasts and in the city of Kyiv. Adding the Yulia Tymoshenko bloc's 7.21 percent, national democrats obtained nearly a third of the vote (30.77 percent).

The 2002 vote for the two national democratic blocs thus represented a return to the popularity levels of December 1991. In the last two years, Yushchenko's popularity ratings have remained stable at 25-30 percent. No other Ukrainian politician is anywhere remotely close. This has perhaps made him and his bloc overly confident about his chances in the October 2004 presidential election. After all, the core national democratic vote is not sufficient to win a presidential election.

If Yushchenko's ratings were 50-60 percent, he could be certain of victory in the first round of an election. But he is bound to be aware that if he faces an oligarch candidate in the second round, the Communists would likely desert the opposition and urge their supporters back the oligarch. After all, they followed just that line in the April 2001 vote of no confidence in the Yushchenko government.

Given the divisions between Eastern and Western Ukraine, Yushchenko can hardly expect 50-60 percent ratings. In the March elections, Our Ukraine did not even make it over the 4 percent barrier in the two Donbas oblasts, which account for 10 percent of the national population, and the city of Sevastopol. Ominously, Donetsk governor Viktor Yanukevych, who was able to block the opposition in Donetsk Oblast and ensure it was the only oblast where For a United Ukraine was able to come first, was made prime minister last month.

Yushchenko and the oligarchs

Yushchenko's tactics since the election have been to some extent understandable. To be sure of victory in 2004, some oligarchic support would be useful in Eastern Ukraine. Moderate oppositionists like Yushchenko look upon the oligarchs in a pragmatic manner - some are good and some are downright bad. By contrast, the romantic-radical Socialists and the former oligarch Tymoshenko see them as all bad.

Our Ukraine clearly consider the SDPU(u), led by Presidential Administration head Viktor Medvedchuk, to be beyond the pale. Our Ukraine deputy and Writers Union head Volodymyr Yavorivsky said in Toronto in September that the actions of the SDPU(u) are inexcusable as they "stole directly from the budget."

Kyiv Mayor Oleksandr Omelchenko shares this aversion, and he ensured that virtually no SDPU(u) posters were to be seen in the capital during this year's campaign. Though the SDPU(u) is the political wing of the so-called Kyiv clan, the parliamentary and concurrent local elections demonstrated that it is not popular in Kyiv.

Meanwhile, Our Ukraine has attempted to broker deals with such "good" oligarchs as Viktor Pinchuk and Serhy Tyhypko as well as former Tax Administration head and now First Deputy Prime Minister Mykola Azarov. There are some slight indications that, unlike the SDPU(u), these figures may wish to gain legitimacy and move Ukraine forward. Even Valery Pustovoitenko's People's Democratic Party, the failed "party of power" from the 1998 elections, is voicing criticism and claims it is not an "oligarchic" party. However, Medvedchuk has been able to effectively block any deals between Yushchenko and the eastern oligarchs.

A Yushchenko victory in 2004 would, of course, be considered a major threat by Kuchma, who is fearful for his retirement, and the oligarchs, who fear corruption and abuse of power charges in the post-Kuchma era. Without the accusations against Kuchma arising from the Melnychenko tapes, Yushchenko might have succeeded in convincing Kuchma that he would give him immunity. However, after the release of the tapes and the collapse of the parliamentary majority created during the early 2000 "velvet revolution," Kuchma was left paranoid about his future and increasingly reliant on Medvedchuk for his personal security.

In the meantime, Yushchenko has little choice but to carve out for himself a moderate oppositionist stance. Ukrainians prefer to elect strong leaders. Since the elections, Yushchenko's leadership skills have looked weak. However, he still has time to rectify this before the election. Anti-corruption and anti-oligarchic rhetoric might even win Yushchenko votes in Eastern Ukraine.

If Kuchma wants to ensure stability and security after 2004, his successor cannot come from one of the three main clans: SDPU(u) (Kyiv), Labor Ukraine (Dnipropetrovsk) and Regions of Ukraine (Donetsk). This would alter the balance of power and lead to clan conflict. Yushchenko's rival may therefore turn out to be disgraced former Minister of Interior Yury Kravchenko, who has recently been appointed head of the State Tax Administration. He is devotedly loyal to Kuchma, but is not a member of any of the three main clans.

Finally, regardless of who is elected president in 2004, Kuchma should not count on enjoying immunity forever. He may reflect on the experience of Yugoslavia and Chile in dealing with discredited leaders who thought they could live peacefully in retirement.