By Analyst Yuliya Mostova
Zerkalo Nedeli, Kiev, Ukraine, in Russian 17 Apr 04; p 1, 2
BBC Monitoring Service, UK, in English, Apr 29, 2004

The following is the text of Yuliya Mostova's article entitled "Yanukovych: winning or losing" published in the analytical weekly Zerkalo Nedeli on 17 April; subheadings inserted editorially:

PREMIER AND HIS RIVALS

Leonid Kuchma's decision to nominate Viktor Yanukovych as the single candidate from the propresidential majority was equally predictable and surprising. This line was predictable because of the incumbent prime minister's high popularity rating. The authorities' reform initiatives have fizzled out. To act logically in this situation, they should make a stake on the most popular figure in their ranks. In this sense, Yanukovych's rating is beyond any comparison with the pittance of popularity won by [head of the presidential administration, Viktor] Medvedchuk, [National Bank of Ukraine governor Serhiy] Tyhypko or [former Prime Minister Anatoliy] Kinakh.

Yet the issue of a choice remained in suspense due to covert differences among major holders of the parliamentary majority having no trust in one another for a number of well-known reasons. Zerkalo Nedeli published an article entitled "Alien and even more alien" looking at problems facing progovernment elites in making this political choice. It was an attempt to analyse what living conditions oligarchs would have under Yushchenko and Yanukovych if either of them became president.

Problems in relations among the president's entourage have long been known. Quite a number of people in that circle would rather let power go to an opposition representative than a business rival among their political allies. More than that, Leonid Kuchma himself is well aware that Yanukovych is not his fosterling or heir. The incumbent president views the Donetsk group's figurehead either as a tool for his last and crucial game or a stake he had to make having no real choice.

The president is certainly well informed that the prime minister's supporters have doubts that he is the best choice. Leonid Kuchma himself is far from being delighted at Yanukovych standing for president. Nonetheless, having met Viktor Yanukovych twice during this week, Leonid Kuchma did make his choice. Stepan Havrysh, the parliamentary majority's coordinator, announced the decision to nominate Yanukovych as the single candidate from a coalition of, quote, democratic forces.

I would say in passing that this telltale self-definition - a coalition of democratic forces - shows in a Freudian manner that a group of people has certain complexes. Yet we are discussing another subject today. Our subject is what made the president jump to this decision. There are quite a lot of such reasons. Let us try and sort out the main ones.

PRESIDENT'S CONTROL OF PARLIAMENT

First, the constitutional reform collapsed giving a shock to its proponents, in particular, the president. All vehicles of pressure available to the authorities were at work, but the 18-month project just fizzled out. The president was so disappointed that his comment on the situation came only five days later in an interview with the Interfax news agency. His comment was nerveless and inarticulate. Viktor Medvedchuk, the ideologist of all reform options, has so far been unable to utter a word of comment, either as the head of the presidential administration, or as leader of one of the biggest parties [United Social Democratic Party of Ukraine].

The authorities were looking confounded and perplexed. For this very reason, the president needed to convince the public that, with all his sorrow about the reform, he still had a well-considered strategic plan and the authorities were prepared to carry it out. The nomination of Yanukovych was intended to demonstrate that the authorities continue to know what to do.

Second, the president needs to keep the parliamentary majority in place. Today its existence is very much in doubt: Havrysh's subordinates have failed to muster [the required minimum of] 226 votes to get the reform law through. If supporters of first-past-the-post elections succeed in their plans to form a new faction in the Supreme Council [parliament], we will be able to discuss a new format of the majority in more specific terms.

Yet the president needs to keep precisely his own majority because it symbolizes and demonstrates that the president keeps control of the country. A president without a majority is no boss. The president's weakening, associated above all with his looming end of term, is being much talked about. So it is a matter of principle for him to keep the parliamentary majority.

Moreover, if the president is still going to push the constitutional reform through parliament, which involves a repeat vote on the failed draft law, he must think about keeping the majority to form the "right" pro-Kuchma post-reform Cabinet of Ministers. Let us recall that it should be manned with faithful and loyal people to work at least until 2006, whoever might be the new president. (To many people, this is the gist of reform.)

Finally, the president is not indifferent to what kind of parliamentary majority will remain after he goes and what kind of decisions concerning the former president it can botch up in the session hall. The nomination of Yanukovych as the single candidate is meant to cement the majority and to keep people's hands and heads busy.

PRESIDENT AS REFEREE

Third, declaring Yanukovych as the authorities' creature seriously harms prospects for agreement between [Viktor Yushchenko's opposition bloc] Our Ukraine and the Donetsk team. We remember a period when their relations were pretty warm and friendly. It should not be ruled out that Viktor Yushchenko is still travelling in the armoured Mercedes car once presented by [Donetsk tycoon] Rinat Akhmetov. Yanukovych's arrival at the Cabinet of Ministers worsened contacts, which had been maintained mainly by [former Deputy Prime Minister] Vitaliy Hayduk. Why should the Donetsk guys rely on a surrogate father for their future victories if they could grow financially without adulterating their clan's blood?

After a while it became clear that Viktor Yanukovych was not all that good at lobbying. His bull-in-a-china-shop manners have often done harm rather than good to his team members both in and outside Ukraine. Rinat Akhmetov has never been able to say that this Cabinet of Ministers is his cabinet. Members of the Regions [of Ukraine] faction spotted a kind of inadequacy in their leader Yanukovych ahead of the vote on the reform law because of his unusually inarticulate stance and tremendous dependence on the president's sentiments and whims.

A set of the clan's internal circumstances has caused a rift between the Donetsk group's financial leaders and Yanukovych as its political leader. Andriy Klyuyev, deputy prime minister in charge of the fuel and energy sector, has been regarded of late as the only man totally devoted to the prime minister. According to some data, Klyuyev has taken on the bulk of costs and effort to ensure a political future for Yanukovych. The possibility of agreements with Our Ukraine is getting back to life.

An alliance between eastern Ukraine's real bosses and western Ukraine's favourites could actually have put an end to the president's right to play a key role in the big game. Such an alliance could have offered stability to Donetsk and its business without any personnel commitments or yielding an election victory to Viktor Yushchenko. However, the nomination of Yanukovych this week has nipped in the bud all talk of potential alliance because it has resuscitated the desire of Donetsk bosses to gain all, rather than keep what they have. As a result, the president remains the referee on the field.

SIGNAL TO BUSINESS ELITE

Fourth, the president knows better than you and I the attitude of the business elite to Yanukovych's presidential prospects. Speaking diplomatically, their attitude is wary. If Leonid Kuchma sticks to his reform plans, which seems to be true, he must be thinking that those who refused to cast their votes for reform need a cold shower to open their eyes to the following message: "You are preserving the formidable presidential powers not for Yushchenko but for Yanukovych. Look at our hero.

You know what he is capable of. You can figure out how his capabilities will multiply when he gets my present powers." In this situation, Yanukovych is called to scare parliament into gathering 300 votes in support of constitutional reform, which envisages a distribution of powers among the president, parliament and the Cabinet of Ministers.

Psychologically, the calculation underlying this option is fairly correct. It should also be noted that carrying out reform was a precondition set to Yanukovych as the single candidate. However, it still remains quite unclear what kind of reform the president wants. Does the president want Yanukovych to ensure a repeat vote on draft law 4105 for a new result?

Will the president be happy with available draft laws having passed expert analysis at the Constitutional Court, including one offered by [Socialist Party leader Oleksandr] Moroz? Or maybe he means that a third option should be drawn up, voted in by a simple majority at this session and approved by 300 votes in September? All these are different strategies calling for different organizational, intellectual and financial cost.

One thing can be said with certainty. If the point at issue is a repeat vote, it would be highly unlikely, despite Yanukovych's ability to turn up with bags of carrots in such circumstances, unlike the stick-toting Medvedchuk. In addition, it would be illegitimate and it would finally drive reform into a legislative deadlock, even if it wins 300 votes. If parliament approves the draft, it will plant so many time bombs that not only Yanukovych but even [Our Ukraine faction member Prof] Ihor Yukhnovskyy could repeal the reform through a court of general jurisdiction, if only he were elected president.

As regards approving other reform options in September, that situation would open up a lot of possibilities. We should not rule out the possibility of alliance among the president and Our Ukraine, Moroz and Our Ukraine (meaning United Social Democratic Party of Ukraine-Our Ukraine [as published]), or just a pre-electoral chaos when the boss has gone but no heir has come yet. Not a very good time for reform.

SIGNAL TO KREMLIN

Fifth, it was important for the president to have a declared strategy in domestic policy and lend logic to his moves in fighting for power ahead of his meeting with Vladimir Putin. Kuchma's fiasco in parliament could lead the Russian president, who has total control over both chambers in Russia's parliament, to doubt that Kuchma could fully control the situation in Ukraine. Kuchma had to come to negotiations with a ready-made action plan. Yanukovych as the single candidate is not a super option in this sense but he is better than nothing.

For his part, Viktor Yanukovych is struggling for Russian support. Legends are going about in Moscow, annoying Vladimir Putin by the way, that Yanukovych's envoys have presented a host of arguments to representatives of various segments of the Russian elite.

Alongside this, as we have written before, the Russians have no candidate of theirs in Ukraine. According to some data, a representative plenipotentiary of the Russian "Family" visited Viktor Yanukovych in Donetsk during Easter. The person holds a pretty significant position in Putin's official hierarchy, representing oligarchic Russia. We do not know the subject of their discussion but we know the following. The "Family" sharing power with Putin can give the Ukrainian candidate only the kind of things he already has in abundance: money and media. Yanukovych needs no public support from Putin.

In this matter, Vladimir Putin will have to grapple with his intrinsic principles. According to his Ukrainian colleagues, a man seasoned in KGB service will find it not so easy to back a candidate with two previous convictions. Yet if Putin comes to understand that Yanukovych is not a figurehead but a real stake of the incumbent authorities and if, for its part, the "Family" decides to back the Donetsk team's man, we cannot rule out the possibility of Putin's articulate public support for Yanukovych.

The single candidate needs this to qualitatively boost his popularity rating. The first step along this line was made during Medvedchuk's meeting with Putin, when Putin said: "We'll accept any decision of the Ukrainian people, we'll work with any Ukrainian leadership. But we'd like to count on continuity being preserved in the future..." [ellipsis as published]

PRESIDENT AND OPPOSITION LEADER

There might be one more reason why Leonid Kuchma has decided on his own to nominate Yanukovych: the president needs a vantage point from which to bargain with Yushchenko.

Actually there has been a thin negotiating thread between Leonid Kuchma and a representative of the Our Ukraine faction. Contrary to a number of media reports, Yushchenko has not met the president for a long time. The possibility of their meeting should not be ruled out now. There were plans for them to meet after reform. Yet reform failed, as is known. Its failure enraged the president, putting paid for a while to Leonid Kuchma's chances to be elected for a third term, albeit not as the guarantor [president] but as an arbiter. Arbiter is just the word used by Russian spin doctors in their ample analytical memos to define Leonid Kuchma's role for the next five years.

Should the president decide to negotiate with Viktor Yushchenko now, he should take account of the new circumstances and offer a different bargaining system, possibly with Yanukovych as one of his best trump cards. It should not be ruled out that Leonid Kuchma may be quicker than his major supporters in putting his eggs in two baskets. I admit it is not the president's style but it is the style of the times and circumstances because Yanukovych and Yushchenko appear as comparable candidates today, in terms of their chances of winning.

The president does not know how far the West can go in its sanctions over administrative support to the authorities' candidate in the elections. The president does not know how Yanukovych is going to act if he wins real power. The president does not know how his supporters are going to behave and how sincere they will be in public statements about their support for a single candidate, especially if it is Viktor Yanukovych. This is why it should not be ruled out that, upon recovery from the defeat he suffered in parliament, Leonid Kuchma may resume negotiations with Our Ukraine.

PRESIDENT'S BEST BET OR PLAYTHING?

These are basically the president's main reasons. We have an idea about them yet we cannot answer the question, whether Kuchma is playing or toying with Yanukovych. Apart from this, it remains unknown how seriously the presidential entourage is going to play him. This is even more important than the definiteness of the president himself. Faction leaders were summoned in the morning without the slightest idea about the reason for the meeting. This fact suggests that the original decision had been taken in camera.

Amateurish public support activity taking place solely in Donetsk Region shows that Medvedchuk's spin doctors, who usually work big, have nothing to do with it. Viktor Yanukovych evidently decided to rely solely on [Rinat Akhmetov's associate, Kiev-Konti company's director] Borys Kolesnykov and his native Donetsk land in a matter as important as a civic miniforum. This is why statements by politically bound civil persons sounded lacking in scale and modesty, especially taking into account the hero's place of birth.

Speaking in an interview with [opposition web site] Ukrayinska Pravda, Stepan Havrysh said frankly, as is his wont, that Viktor Medvedchuk had stayed out of discussion with "leaders of democratic forces", while other sources say that the USDPU leader was scanty of words and extremely sullen after the meeting.

On the one hand, Viktor Medvedchuk is easy to understand. He has not and cannot get any guarantees of a bright future under President Yanukovych. There is only a word to believe but Medvedchuk knows the worth of words only too well. On the other hand, he had spent nearly two years at the presidential administration preparing reform, he had all the leverage available to ensure the necessary outcome of voting but he failed. Therefore, he just has no right for some time after the failure to suggest strategic initiatives to the president or speak critically about the president's decisions.

[Kuchma's son-in-law] Viktor Pinchuk, whose relations with the prime minister could hardly be described as cloudless of late, has not had his say yet. Statements by [National Bank of Ukraine governor] Serhiy Tyhypko who supported Yanukovych at the quasi-debate on his nomination, can be taken as nothing more than Serhiy Tyhyphko's statements: Mr Tyhypko sometimes makes independent steps in politics.

SCENARIOS FOR NEAR FUTURE

To put it in a nutshell, the president has started a new phase of the game. We will learn pretty soon whether it is true or false. For instance, Viktor Yanukovych asked the president a few months ago to replace some five or six [regional] governors. The prime minister's requests were left unanswered. If Yanukovych is now the real single candidate, he needs a personnel network made up of his men who could efficiently work for him during the elections. The current corps of governors is wary about Yanukovych.

However, it is this corps that is called to make up the mainstay of an efficient headquarters: the authorities have no more large-scale structure like [MP Oleksandr] Volkov's Social Protection [fund] to penetrate the capillaries of villages and settlements. Therefore, the president should give Yanukovych a free hand to select personnel. If this does not happen in the next month, the Yanukovych game will turn out to be no more than toying.

Also indicative will be party congresses. Most of them have been scheduled for June, just before the start of the electoral campaign. Apropos, the faction leaders met in the absence of [parliament speaker] Volodymyr Lytvyn (probably it was Viktor Medvedchuk's petty revenge for Lytvyn's tough stand against a repeat vote on draft law 4105) and with no binding effect on anyone. Its hastiness puzzled even Yanukovych's supporters, let alone all others. Serious decisions will be taken at party congresses. If the president comes up with another strategy during this phase, Yanukovych may be short of votes within the coalition.

It may also happen that voting is okay but the candidate does not feel that something real is being done to back the voting result. Assume the prime minister fails to see through the reform or to meet his social commitments, what then? What if he makes economic mistakes as head of government? What if his previous deeds transpire to the public? What if not all of those once hurt are ready to come to terms? How about those with whom it is too late to come to terms? It may turn out bad because the parties intending to back the prime minister have the parliamentary elections looming in 2006 ... [ellipsis as published]

PRESIDENT'S HIDDEN AGENDA?

Furthermore, judging by his multiple slips, the president has lost that sense of time contracting like pebble-leather. Given this, is it not possible that he has decided to play one more game and get rid of competitors? This might be the reason why Yanukovych's nomination was too hasty to be effective. The president wants no overt conflict with the Donetsk team but some observers think that Leonid Kuchma may hug Viktor Yanukovych to death and plot an effective intrigue to sideline him before the race starts. After all, everyone remembers the president after his victory in 1999 coming up to parliament with [Valeriy] Pustovoytenko as candidate for prime minister. He had first made sure that Pustovoytenko could not make it.

If Yanukovych is benched until the end of campaigning, the coalition in power will find no single candidate better than Leonid Kuchma. Alternative to Leonid Kuchma might be a situation with [Defence Minister Yevhen] Marchuk, Tyhypko, Kinakh and Pustovoytenko grappling with opposition candidates... [ellipsis as published] Yet this option could come out of the authority's despair rather than strategy.

The president has chosen a difficult path, as we can see. We can only watch curiously Leonid Kuchma leading Viktor Yanukovych along this path and wonder how far they will go and if the incumbent president can stop where he plans to do so. Some people in Kuchma's entourage are asking the question: "Is Kuchma aware that, being in time trouble, he made a move that let out of the bottle not even a genie but rather an asphalt spreader, complete with a vertical take-off function. How about a brake to stop it? Yet there is no stopping: neither scheming, nor joint efforts will help... [ellipsis as published]

Some experts may be overstating Viktor Yanukovych's weight category and political determination, while in actual fact he is ready to act precisely within the space to be allocated for his self-actualization by the incumbent president. It is the president that has no right to error. In actual fact, however, Leonid Kuchma will never get an ideal option under any situation because there is no time left for him and no faith left in him.