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Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP)
Washington, D.C., Wednesday, March 31, 2004
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WASHINGTON, D.C. - On March 29, 2004, the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace (CEIP) hosted a discussion on the state of Ukrainian
politics with Borys Tarasyuk, Chairman of the People's Movement of Ukraine
(known as the "Rukh"), a deputy chairman of Our Ukraine, and a member of
the Verkhovna Rada.
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Borys Tarasyuk
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Roman Zvarych, another Our Ukraine member of parliament, also took part.
Dr. Anders Aslund, Director of the Carnegie Endowment's Russian and Eurasian
Program, chaired the meeting.
Ambassador Tarasyuk began by noting that the forthcoming presidential
election would be the third-most-important event in the history of domestic
Ukrainian politics, after the restoration of independence in 1991 and the
adoption of a constitution in 1996. It would have immense implications for
the region, and for Europe as a whole. Ukraine's membership of the European
Union and NATO depends on the outcome of this election. Should a member
of the current regime take power, Ukrainian integration into these
structures would be set back eight or ten years.
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Yuliya Tymoshenko
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The effects of the forthcoming presidential election will perhaps be felt
for 50 years to come. A recent Democratic Initiative survey indicated that
84 percent of Ukrainians consider the election to be "very important." Thus,
its importance is understood by the public, and not overstated by
politicians.
After independence, power to Ukraine went to nomenklatura holdouts and the
"red directors" of enterprises, who tried to institute autocracy in the
country. The presidency became an institution that gave power to an
unpopular person (Leonid Kuchma, with about 7 percent support) surrounded
by clans concerned with their own economic interests.
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Center-right political forces enjoy the support of the public, but are in
opposition. Thus, Our Ukraine, which is the largest faction in the Ukrainian
parliament, the Verkhovna Rada, with 99 deputies or more, is in opposition
to the ruling regime. If Viktor Yushchenko wins the presidential election,
Our Ukraine's presence in the Rada may increase by 50 to 100 percent. So
far, whatever government has been in power in Ukraine, except for Mr.
Yushchenko's, its policies have been the same.
Recently, a process of constitutional change has begun, aimed at changing
Ukraine from a presidential-parliamentary republic to a
parliamentary-presidential one. Such a system would not be bad in principle
if it ensures the prevalence of democracy, and establishes a system that
would prevent a repetition of the Kuchma phenomenon.
However, the aim of the constitutional reform package is not better
governance, but rather the usurpation of power by the current regime. The
authorities are not acting sincerely. Civil society, the media and rule of
law are all under attack. The opposition wins elections, but others remain
in power. The regime is not accountable to the people's will, and,
furthermore, distorts and manipulates public opinion. Political scandals do
not seem to affect those on top of the system. Major Mykola Melnychenko's
tapes have not had a significant effect. The regime killed Heorhiy Gongadze,
Vyacheslav Chornovil, and Ihor Aleksandrov, and has gotten away with it.
The state machine is being used to suppress the opposition. Businesses
sympathetic to the opposition are under attack. Ukraine finds itself in a
deep political crisis, despite a GDP growth rate of 8 percent. The major
business clans are accumulating wealth by operating in the shadow economy
and using their closeness to President Kuchma to avoid taxation. There is a
growing gap between rich and poor in Ukraine - one of the greatest in
Europe.
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Viktor Yushchenko ArtUkraine.com Information Service Photo (Click on image to enlarge it)
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There are two distinctions between the presidential campaigns of 1999 and
2004. In 1999, the regime used Yevhen Marchuk as a Trojan horse to destroy
the opposition. The Communist leader, Petro Symonenko, became the opposition
candidate, which was precisely what Mr. Kuchma wanted, because Mr.
Symonenko was easy to beat. Now the authorities are using a different
tactic: they have started changing the electoral rules. They are trying to
switch powers from the president to the prime minister, who would be elected
by a parliament under their control. This would keep power in the hands of
the
current regime, and allow the regime to replicate itself later.
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The current reform proposals run counter to Mr. Kuchma's prior endeavors.
The president has been toying with the idea of constitutional reform since
2000. However, he sought greater powers for himself since coming into office
in 1996. The quest for such powers has been a consistent policy line for
him. Even as early as 1993, Mr. Kuchma wanted greater powers for the post of
prime minister when he himself occupied that position. In his newer
proposals for constitutional reform, he floated the idea of a two-chamber
parliament, where powers would mostly move to the upper house, which would
be controlled by him. Thus, Mr. Tarasyuk does not believe in President
Kuchma's sincerity in the constitutional reform process.
The new version of reforms has been dubbed the Medvedchuk-Symonenko
package. Everybody has accepted this name, even though Viktor Medvedchuk
is not a member of parliament, but rather Mr. Kuchma's chief of staff, and
is thus not supposed to propose legislation.
The desire to undermine the constitution has been so strong on the part of
the regime, that proper parliamentary procedure has not been followed
regarding the constitutional reform issue. On December 24, 2003, the reform
package was approved in the first reading by a show of hands. The
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) declared this move to
be contrary to the Ukrainian constitution. The December events became
possible when the communists left the opposition and joined the so-called
majority in parliament. In February 2004, the Socialists participated in an
effort to legitimize the December vote. If the authorities continue down the
unconstitutional road they have taken, the constitutional amendments may be
adopted by next month.
The communists and socialists lent their support to the regime in exchange
for the regime's support for a proportional system in parliamentary
elections and a new local election system. Last week, considerable change
was introduced through the new electoral law, which mandates proportional
representation with a 3 percent threshold. However, monitoring of the
elections by NGOs was banned.
Meanwhile, the opposition has shrunk from four parties to two: only Our
Ukraine and the Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc are still in opposition. The EU sent
a strong message to Ukrainian authorities on January 28, 2004 condemning its
tampering with the constitution. The PACE sent a similar, but more detailed,
report on January 29. The European Parliament also approved a resolution
condemning the Ukrainian regime. Unfortunately, nothing similar has come
from the United States.
Turning to the subject of possible candidates in the upcoming presidential
election, Mr. Tarasyuk noted that Vyktor Yushchenko has been the most
popular politician in Ukraine for the last three years, his support ranging
from 24 to 27 percent. He is followed in popularity by the current prime
minister, Vyktor Yanukovych, with 14 percent, Petro Symonenko with 11
percent, and Yuliya Tymoshenko and Oleksandr Moroz, with 6 percent each.
Another poll asked whom voters would elect if Mr. Yushchenko were the single
candidate of three opposition forces (Our Ukraine, the Tymoshenko Bloc, and
the Socialist Party). In this scenario, around 30 percent would vote for
Yushchenko, and about 14 percent for Mr. Yanukovych.
A majority (53 percent) of those surveyed wanted President Kuchma to resign.
Further, 45 percent said they would oppose any successor nominated by
Kuchma. According to a poll taken last month, 73 percent would not vote for
Mr. Kuchma. The same survey indicated that, in a second-round face-off
between Yushchenko and Yanukovych, 40 percent would support the former,
and 23 percent would vote for the latter.
When asked to name the greatest current opposition leader, most people chose
Mr. Yushchenko. The situation was different even six months ago, when many
were complaining that Mr. Yushchenko was not visible enough as an opposition
leader, and did not oppose the regime strongly enough. Yuliya Tymoshenko was
the more noticeable opposition leader at the time. Now, however, the public
perception of Mr. Yushchenko has changed. At the same time, the regime is
trying to push him far to the right and depict him as an extremist; if it
succeeds, Yushchenko would lose public support, because the Ukrainian
electorate favors moderation.
A new development in Ukrainian politics is the attack by President Kuchma on
the elected mayors of several cities, namely Odesa, Mukachevo, Krasny Luch,
Romny, and, most recently, Ternopil. Mr. Tarasyuk saw these moves as the
regime's rehearsal for the elections. They are trying to see what the
reaction would be if opposition candidates, such as Mr. Yushchenko, are
disqualified. The low-key international response to the attack on mayors is
a wrong signal to send to the regime. The regime backed off on previous
occasions when the international response was stronger.
Nowadays, Our Ukraine bears the brunt of anti-opposition attacks. There are
rumors of an $80 million fund to buy off Our Ukraine deputies. The coalition
is a major obstacle in the path of unlimited rule by the regime.
Mr. Yushchenko would like to transform his nine-party coalition into a
single party. However, it is already too late for such a move, and to
undertake it now would amount to political suicide. Human and other
resources would have to be diverted to this reorganization from the
coalition's major aim, which is to win the presidency. As the leader of
Rukh, Mr. Tarasyuk thought that Our Ukraine could eventually lead to the
formation of two strong parties.
Currently, the authorities are trying to muzzle the free media in
preparation for the presidential election. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty,
Deutsche Welle and the BBC have been taken off the local airwaves. Silski
visti, a large-circulation newspaper, has been closed. The regime has been
trying to close the independent Channel Five television station.
The government uses fairly honest economic statistics, and the macroeconomic
figures look good. However, the price of basic goods is rising. The minimum
wage has been reduced from 237 hryvnias to 205. In a democratic country, a
government that reduced the minimum wage would not survive. However, the
Ukrainian government does not care about the reality that people have to
deal with. Moreover, it has been trying to hide 10 billion hryvnias from the
public.
As a result of the regime's policies, the image of Ukraine in the eyes of
the EU is low. The EU has sent Ukraine negative signals about prospective
membership, and the NATO Istanbul summit is unlikely to have a positive
outcome for Ukraine. The United States is busy with other things, and thus
does has not been paying much attention to Ukrainian affairs. However, there
are signs of a changing attitude in Washington. Mr. Tarasyuk concluded that
democracy in Ukraine is in jeopardy. Compared to Belarus or the Central
Asian states, however, Ukraine is democratic, but those countries are not
the example to follow.
In the question and answer session, Mr. Tarasyuk noted that the Ukrainian
Constitutional Court passed a ruling contrary to the constitution when it
said that Mr. Kuchma could run for president again if he so wished. A court
in Kiev recently gave the judge who defended Ms. Tymoshenko a two-year
suspended sentence. There are strong law schools in Kharkiv, Kiev, Odesa and
Lviv, but these are either co-operative with the regime, or they are
ignored. There is now an imbalance between the three branches of government,
with the executive dominating the other two. This state of affairs has been
criticized by the PACE.
Mr. Zvarych added that the February 3, 2004 vote on constitutional
amendments was taken in a seven-minute extraordinary session, despite the
fact that the Constitutional Court had ruled in 2001 that constitutional
amendments could not be discussed in an extraordinary session. However,
the court stayed silent about this violation of its own ruling.
Regarding the Communists and Socialsts, Mr. Tarasyuk said that Mr. Moroz
seceded from Our Ukraine because of personal ambition. There is no
likelihood of his supporting a united opposition candidate in the
presidential election. As for the Communists, they are being used by the
regime, just as they were in 1999. They were thus never truly in opposition.
When asked about what methods the United States could use to pressure
Ukraine in favor of democracy, Mr. Zvarych cited Mr. Yushchenko's suggestion
that the U.S. implement a policy of "escalating linkage." In Mr. Zvarych's
own opinion, the NATO summit would be an excellent venue to criticize Kiev.
The United States could also take issue with Ukraine's entry into a Single
Economic Space with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, because such a space,
which is meant to lead to a customs union, could impede Ukraine's accession
to the World Trade Organization. The recent remarks of U.S. Deputy Secretary
of State Richard Armitage signaled a move to "balanced criticism" on the
part of the United States.
On a different question, Mr. Zvarych noted that the regime wants Ms.
Tymoshenko to run for president, but her bloc has come to an understanding
with Our Ukraine, whereby they will coordinate strategies and resources.
In conclusion, Mr. Tarasyuk observed that the authorities were trying to buy
off the security forces in preparation for the election. The salaries of
interior ministry forces, the police, the security service, and the armed
forces, have been raised. There has also been a minor rise in pensions.
Although it seems that important reforms have been made in the parliamentary
election process, Mr. Tarasyuk believes that these will be watered down
dramatically before the next parliament is elected.
Summary prepared by Rashed Chowdhury, Junior Fellow with the Russian and
Eurasian program at the Carnegie Endowment.
FOR PERSONAL AND ACADEMIC USE ONLY
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