ANALYSIS: By Peter Lavelle for UPI
United Press International, Moscow, Russia, April 22, 2004

Ukraine's policy of looking to the East as well as the West has divided Ukrainians into roughly three groups: those who would like to see Ukraine eventually accepted into Western economic, political and even military structures, ethnic Russian Ukrainians who still identify closely with Russia, and a significant minority who appear not to care.

Ukraine's foreign policy has been very active recently. On Wednesday, Russia's parliament reacted angrily to what it believes to be Ukraine's rapprochement with NATO and Ukrainian law that went into effect this week mandating that television and radio stations will broadcast only in Ukrainian.

Russian and Ukrainian parliaments simultaneously ratified important agreements concerning borders, including regulation of the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait -- both at the center of an explosive and what could have been a dangerous military dispute at the end of last year.

The Azov seabed is believed to be rich in oil reserves, while the Kerch Strait, which allows access to the Black Sea, is considered to be of strategic military importance for the Kremlin. The border agreement signed this week was what Russia has always wanted: joint governance and exploitation of the Sea of Azov, as well as mandating that the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait as inland waters of the two countries -- ensuring that third parties (read: NATO) will be denied access to these waterways.

A second agreement was ratified that recognized the state borders of each country, as well as normalizing regulations for border crossings by commercial entities, private individuals as well as the permanency of the border.

The third agreement, called the Single Economic Space, could have significant long-term meaning for Russian-Ukrainian relations. It encompasses a customs union, common tax code, joint financial policies, foreign trade policy, and hints of a common currency. The foreign trade policy element included a free-trade zone including Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. The EU and the United States have concerns about Russia's growing ambitions in the former Soviet Union.

Ukraine just might have the most eclectic foreign policy in the world. It has often been noted that there are "two Ukraines." Geographically, half the country is westward leaning, with the other focused on its historic relationship with Russia. The power and influence of both "Ukraines" is reflected in the country's foreign policies toward an expanding EU and Russia. However, there is a "third Ukraine" that denies the "European westerners" or the "eastern Slavs" political hegemony.

Ukraine's eclectic foreign policy is a reflection of Ukrainian nation-building at a dead end. Ukrainians who comprise of the third groups reject both Ukrainian nationalism and Eurasian or neo-Soviet patriotism. These are many of the same people who have not benefited from Ukraine's transitions away from communism.

The political elite inherited from the Soviet period is most responsible for the existence for this group. Not adhering to any meaningful ideology beyond power itself, the current ruling elite promotes disrespect for the law, unchecked corruption, and widespread state surveillance of citizens.

This week, Ukraine tried to show itself to be a good neighbor to the EU and Russia. However, it actually showed that it might not be a reliable partner for either. Making too many promises to the EU and Russia only intensifies divisions among some Ukrainians, while increasing the alienation of others.

Ukraine can be a reliable partner only when the majority of Ukrainians come to understand what is best for Ukraine first, then its neighbors. Given Ukraine's current political elite, that prospect is a long way off.