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OP-ED By Taras Kuzio
Kyiv Post, Kyiv, Ukraine, March 25, 2004
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Andrey Slivka set the cat among the pigeons in his Feb. 18 opinion piece
"How the Diaspora can be effective: some quick notes." The article
elicited both positive and negative reactions from the Ukrainian
Diaspora.
Slivka had little positive to say about Ukrainian Diaspora attitudes
towards Ukraine. Indeed, I would agree that some in the Diaspora have
little understanding of developments in Ukraine, and often see it
through western Ukrainian eyes. This, though, does not mean that they do
not care about the country.
One could also look at it the other way. How do the Ukrainian
authorities look at the Diaspora? The answer is: in a way similar to the
way they did during the Soviet era. The Ukrainian pro-presidential
forces do not respect the Diaspora. If anything they are both scared of
and despise it.
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We should not be surprised to learn this. After all, Leonid Kravchuk
used to regularly attack the Diaspora when he was the ideological
secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine in the 1980s. Meanwhile,
both Kravchuk and Leonid Kuchma rose up the Communist Party ladder
during Volodymyr Shcherbytsky's era in the 1970s, which saw the most
vicious attacks on the Ukrainian language and dissidents.
A worrying sign is the return to Soviet-era ideological views of the
Diaspora, a return that has manifested itself in two ways.
First, as in the Soviet era, the center-right opposition are
increasingly attacked as "nationalists" and "Nazis." This is especially
prevalent in media affiliated with the Social Democratic Party of
Ukraine (united) and directed predominantly against the "Nashists" (a
play on "Nasha Ukraina", the Ukrainian name for Our Ukraine), a word
which resembles "Nazis." As in the Soviet era, "Nashists" are labelled
"anti-semitic," "anti-Russian" rabid western Ukrainian nationalists who
will seek to incite inter-ethnic conflict if they come to power. As
Kravchuk is the head of the SDPU(u) faction in parliament, he cannot
escape some responsibility for this trend.
The irony is, of course, that Viktor Medvedchuk is from Zhytomyr oblast
in central Ukraine, and that his family was deported to Siberia in 1944
because his father was allegedly a member of the Organization of
Ukrainian Nationalists (a recently published biography gave his father a
different occupation during World War II). Viktor Yushchenko is from
eastern Ukraine. His father was in the Soviet army and, after being
captured, was incarcerated in Auschwitz. As in the Soviet era, Ukraine's
"virtual reality" is usually different from what is publicly stated.
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Second, there's been a return to viewing the Diaspora as "agents of
influence." Secret documents from the State Security Services defector,
General Valery Kravchenko, brought back to Ukraine by Our Ukraine deputy
Mykola Tomenko, give us a good insight into how the SDPU(u) and the
Presidential Administration (both led by Viktor Medvedchuk) have
returned to Tovarystvo Ukrainy ideology and tactics. In the Soviet era,
Tovarystvo Ukrainy was the arm of the KGB that sought to discredit
"bourgeois nationalist" emigres while supporting "progressive" Ukrainian
emigres.
The SBU documents ordered Kravchenko to "activate work among the
Ukrainian Diaspora with the aim of obtaining the necessary information
in the interests of ensuring the security of our country within the
context of the preparation of political reform and the presidential
elections." Not only does this greatly exaggerate the influence of the
Diaspora, but it assumes somehow that it is sympathetic to political
developments in Ukraine. Both are false assumptions.
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Another tactic was introduced a year ago and comes straight out of
George Orwell. The information department of the Presidential
Administration, whose head Serhy Vasylyev should be given the highest
state order for single handedly ruining what little was left of
Ukraine's international reputation, began sending to Diaspora newspapers
missives entitled "Dobri Novyny z Ukrainy" (Good News From Ukraine).
The editors I have spoken to found the texts so amusing they ignored
them.
Impatience with the Diaspora
Slivka is impatient with the Ukrainian Diaspora's view of certain
developments in Ukraine.
To some extent, he has a point. Ukraine has not turned out the way most
members of the Diaspora expected. One increasingly hears the view that
Ukrainians living in Ukraine are not the same as those born in the West.
I would tend to agree, as our political cultures are different: one is
neo-Soviet and the other Western.
There were already problems evident in this area in the late Soviet era.
Visits by family members to Ukraine from 1989 onwards usually ended up
being unpleasant. Fifty years of Soviet rule created a huge gulf between
the groups. I witnessed that myself when my father met his brother and
sister for the first time in 1989, after nearly half a century apart.
Slivka, though, is wrong in one important respect. Diaspora negativity
about Ukraine is not unique to it. Regular surveys of native Ukrainians
show that three quarters of them feel there is a need for a "change in
the country's course," and the authorities are rated negatively in a
whole range of areas by 60 to 80 percent of those polled.
Ukrainian Diaspora disillusionment with Ukraine under Kuchma is not only
a reflection of romantic nostalgia; it also reflects the prevalent view
held by the Western world. Kuchma's international (i.e. Western) image
is so low that it will be impossible to improve before he leaves office.
Western government leaders and international organizations no longer
believe statements by Kuchma and his allies. The outcome of this is that
Ukraine is not treated as a serious country.
This lack of trust in Kuchma and his allies is reflected in "Ukraine
fatigue" in the West. President Kuchma and his allies are seen as
embodying a neo-Soviet political culture. This confirms the already
deeply held stereotypes in the EU and elsewhere that Ukraine is not a
"European" country (the fact that it is geographically inside Europe, as
Ukrainians point out, is irrelevant).
Dr. Taras Kuzio is Resident Fellow, Centre for Russian and East European
Studies and Adjunct Professor, Department of Political Science,
University of Toronto.
FOR PERSONAL AND ACADEMIC USE ONLY
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