"Afterthoughts" By Maksym Strikha
Ukrayinska Pravda web site, Kiev, Ukraine, in Ukrainian 9 Apr 04
BBC Monitoring Service, UK, in English, Apr 28, 2004

The following is the text of the article by Maksym Strikha, entitled "Afterthoughts" and published on the Ukrayinska Pravda web site on 9 April:

Late on the afternoon of 8 April when the number 294 flashed on the screen [in parliament, the number of MP votes for political reform - insufficient for the constitution to be amended] we witnessed the triumph of one group and deep shock for the other. When the next morning came, it was time for analysis and the first conclusions.

I should stress that these are only the first conclusions because the collapse of the [presidential administration chief Viktor] Medvedchuk- [Communist Party leader Petro] Symonenko political reform will have far-reaching and quite ambiguous consequences for Ukraine's political future, which nobody would probably venture to predict now.

Still, we will attempt to single out at least several points (which will certainly become a matter of controversy for analysts and some of which will without doubt be corrected by life).

FIRST. Like all the preceding events surrounding "constitutional reform", the day of 8 April has again demonstrated the absurdity of Ukrainian politics where declared goals and real motivations almost never coincide. There was an attempt to introduce amendments which are democratic in their essence (curtailing the president's powers, responsible government, proportional elections) in order to keep the current ruling elite, antidemocratic in its nature, in power.

Opposing these amendments to the death were those who had earlier had these things inscribed on their banners. The consistent stance of [leader of the Socialist Party Oleksandr] Moroz who stood up for reform because he had nourished the idea in the previous decade became a mere exception which proved the general rule.

SECOND. The vote on 8 April did not become a victory for the opposition (which, instead of the promised "people's revolution", only managed to organize a rally by the walls of parliament with not so many people taking part in it). This vote became a personal defeat of Medvedchuk (who meticulously developed a seemingly impeccable plan for a long time).

At the same time, this vote became a personal victory of several "tough" MPs elected in single-seat constituencies ([reputed Ukrainian tycoon Oleksandr] Volkov, the Derkach father and son [oligarch Andriy Derkach is the son of the former head of the Security Service of Ukraine, Leonid Derkach], [member of the Regions of Ukraine faction Serhiy] Ratushnyak, [member of the European Initiatives faction Volodymyr] Syvkovych and "further down the list"), who secured their right and ability to remain at the forefront of Ukrainian politics in the role of "lone wolves" (only hopeless optimists can now believe that an off-handedly passed proportional electoral law will "survive" until the next elections).

THIRD. The vote on 8 April showed what had long been predicted: as the election approaches, the [propresidential] "majority" is beginning to crumble. The missing seven votes which would have been sufficient to pass political reform could have been provided by the Regions of Ukraine faction, but it turned out the prime minister [Viktor Yanukovych] did not control the situation even in his own group of MPs. (We will dismiss as too bold the idea that Yanukovych deliberately let reform fail to become president with as much power as Kuchma now has).

FOURTH. For many more years Ukraine is to live with the unaltered 1996 constitution. Of course, the draft law on reform may still be put to a vote during this session. Yet, most likely, its result will turn out to be even lower - apparently, all "arguments to persuade" the unruly MPs elected in single-seat constituencies had been employed before 8 April. To hope that the newly elected president (whoever he is) will begin his term of office by attempting to curtail his own power would be at least naive (unless this president's name is Moroz, but this sounds like science fiction).

This means that over a long time we will face the danger of the Kuchma regime being reincarnated (even under a new name but with the same favouritism, behind-the-scenes fights at the foot of the throne and the first man's right to be the ultimate authority in judging anything that happens in the state).

FIFTH. The value of the future presidential election is skyrocketing. Thus, it is bound to be unprecedentedly dirty and ruthless. If the present elite could have let an opposition candidate win on condition that reform is carried out, now it will fight to the end as it realizes that otherwise the new era of "a big-time redistribution" of posts and property would come. At the same time, the arsenal of this elite (administrative and information resources, huge financial reserves, after all, obedient courts able to disqualify any candidate for violations of the campaign rules) is still great.

SIXTH,. The failure of reform makes it more likely that the Kuchma-3 [third-term] scenario will take place. Mr Medvedchuk and Mr Yanukovych have proved unable to ensure scenarios for the "mild" transformation of the regime (with guarantees for its top leaders), and only Kuchma now seems able to consolidate the ruling elite.

At the same time, the president has quite a lot of room for manoeuvre (he can, for example, sack the unpopular Medvedchuk and Yanukovych, who has made a mess of the budget, and can appoint "a prime minister with a human face", concurrently firmly consolidating the managerial and business elite.

If he is accused of authoritarianism, he can appeal to Ukraine and the world: I honestly wanted parliamentarianism, but parliament itself did not want this).

Yet whether Kuchma could seize all these chances within a very limited period of time left for him if he so radically changes his team, is still questionable.

...[ellipsis as published] It is hard to unequivocally say whether Ukraine lost or gained more when it rejected (for a long time) the idea of switching over to the parliamentary-presidential system of power. But it really unsettled me to see [opposition faction leader] Yuliya Tymoshenko, with tears of gratitude in her eyes, thanking the "courageous" Volkov and the Derkach who "did not let the constitution be violated".

It was unsettling because for a second I imagined that the next day these "courageous MPs elected in single-seat constituencies" would stand like a wall around their boss and scorch the "opposition infection" with red-hot iron in their own constituencies.

May God have the fairly disunited opposition (whose campaign has so far resembled "pospolite ruszenie" [the Polish gentry's militia] in times of Rzeczpospolita [name of the Polish state in the period 1569-1795] where magnates of different calibre went with their own resources and people) wake up to the risk to which it doomed Ukraine when it again gave the fate of Ukraine into the hands of one man with all his human virtues and flaws.

At the same time, it should realize its own responsibility to prevent a situation where "the victory" on 8 April will be taken advantage of by somebody else, whose flaws obviously outweigh his virtues.